Bowling Alone
Dear Bob,
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StumbleUponSo, 750 Kalamazooians and surveys about moral decline can't be mistaken? Or at least not any more mistaken than polls that show that people think the country is on the right track, or that they're optimistic about the future? What about the upwards of 90 percent of Americans who consider themselves "middle-class"? And the large numbers that believe in "creation science"? Polls and surveys are curious things and should be taken with a hypertension-inducing dose of salt. Let me apologize in advance for lingering over the less-interesting question of whether your basic premise is descriptive of actual reality. In any case, judging from the crowds you're drawing on your book tour, it sounds like you're getting plenty of time to kick around your proposals for renewing civic America.
If, in fact, social and moral values and community have generally declined, then why has crime fallen over the past decade (even when accounting for changes in the youth population), why has the divorce rate stabilized since the '80s, and why has, by your own measure, volunteering increased? Shouldn't your theory predict the exact opposite? I keep "repeating" that we've experienced a massive, generalized increase in wealth not because I think owning houses and cars are the sine qua non of the good life (though the significant pleasure they bring is a reason why 67 percent and 90 percent of American households own each, respectively) but because such advances complicate your thesis. "Just as areas high in social capital are good at maintaining livable spaces, they are also good at getting ahead," you write. "A growing body of research suggests that where trust and social networks flourish, individuals, firms neighborhoods, and even nations prosper." Maybe the fact that most people are far better off now in absolute terms than they were 30 years--and you agree they are--is a sign that meaningful bonds are still being forged and maintained, whether people acknowledge them as such.
As for "evidence ... that Bowling Alone is mistaken about the declines in the dozens of other forms of community involvement ... let's hear it." Well, Bob, I presented some of that evidence yesterday--figures on parental involvement in education, including increases in attendance at school-board meetings and school events, not to mention boosts in volunteering. Here's some more, from Time for Life: The Surprising Ways Americans Use Their Time (Penn State Press, 1997), by John P. Robinson and Geoffrey Godbey. Now, I know you're familiar with their work, since you wrote the book's preface; our readers should know that the researchers used detailed-time diaries from the ongoing American's Use of Time project to map out how people while away the hours. One of the points you make in your introduction rebuts your contention in our debate that "virtually all the evidence shows a steady decline in the amount of time that parents spend with their kids." As you summarize Time for Life's findings in your intro, "Neglected children? The evidence here suggests that the amount of time parents spend per child has remained essentially constant over these decades [the '60s through the '80s]. The widely discussed reduction in aggregate time spent in child care appears to be almost entirely attributable to declines in the proportion of children in the population."
There's other good news in Time for Life, too: "The commute to work [detailed in the time diaries] has remained virtually identical across time," they write, noting that such a finding is "consistent with Census Bureau data." Overall, they find we've gained about five hours of "free time" a week since the '60s (though like you, they resent how much of that gain goes to TV). The authors are not Pollyannas. Between 1965 and 1985 (the period for which they have complete data), they do in fact find declines in certain aspects of "social capital": Socializing declined by 1.5 hours, participation in official non-religious organizations by 0.1 hours, and sports/cultural events by 0.3 hours. However, on balance, they found overall increases in "communication" (0.8 hours), sports/exercise (1.2 hours), hobbies (0.6 hours), and adult education (0.4 hours). "And across an era when many observers have doubted America's commitment to moral and family values," they note, "attendance at religious services (and organizations) has remained fairly constant." This may not be your optimal community, but clearly it draws a far different picture than you do in Bowling Alone. Maybe not Norman Rockwell, but certainly not your American Gothic, either.
But let me return to your response about parental involvement in education, as I think it gets to the deeper issue dividing us. In your previous entry, you shifted the debate from whether Americans are more involved in their kids' education--which they are--to how many official parent groups--whether PTA or PTO--there are. You like regimented groups, often with uniforms--bowling with buddies is not as good as bowling in leagues; going camping with friends is not as good as joining the Boy Scouts (as a--gasp!--former Eagle Scout, I can say on my honor that the BSA is, on balance, a disturbingly retrograde outfit for all sorts of reasons and I only wish it were truly in decline. Click here for my NPR report on the recent Boy Scout court rulings [requires RealPlayer software]).
Certainly those regimented groups are done for--since the '60s, American culture has gotten a whole lot looser and more informal. Basically, because we're richer and smarter, we feel more empowered to live our lives the way we want to. We've recognized that much--if not all--of what the ruling classes and elite institutions have told us is just plain self-serving bullshit (this awareness, Bob, is especially true among those of us outside such institutions). As I suggested yesterday, we're more antinomian now, all of us, from the lowest to the highest, and we're more likely to tell each other to go fuck off. Effectively, the all-important right of exit from a given situation has been introduced en masse, instead of existing only for the wealthy and well-connected. (I've discussed the theme at length as it relates to cultural production, where it is often mistaken for a decline in standards, rather than recognized as a liberating multiplication of them. Click here for my full argument.) One reading of this is essentially the one you offer: This is the end of civic life, of community, of common purpose. My reading goes the other way: This is the beginning of true community, where all people actually get more of a say in how they live their lives and on what terms. Religious groups, for instance, still command much of our time, but the relationship is substantially different.
Introducing a right of exit--the ability to go elsewhere--makes community more responsive to its members. Just look at all the permutations in school choice and the increased levels of participation and satisfaction they bring over the traditional no-opt-out model. By the same token, it becomes very difficult for any one person or group or elite to enforce a single standard of "community." Social capital, like economic capital, has become deregulated and is more dispersed throughout society. That hasn't immiserated us any more than widely available credit has. As in the economic realm, such deregulation has made us socially richer, more tolerant, and more open than we were--you never did answer the question, "Who among us would rather be living in 1960 ... than today," did you?--and it will help make us richer still in the future, too.
Nick
This week, Nick Gillespie grills Robert Putnam on his book Bowling Alone (click here to read the first chapter of the book, and click here to buy it). Gillespie is the editor of Reason and a frequent contributor to the Web site suck.com, where he writes under the name Mr. Mxyzptlk. Robert Putnam is a professor of public policy at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. 
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Reader Response from The Fray--to be read after the final entry:
It seems to me that income inequality is the elephant in the middle of the room that nobody's talking about here. Mr Putnam's findings that social capital multiplied until about 1970 and has dwindled since at least coincides in time with the pattern of income inequality, which dropped steadily until the 1973 oil-crisis and has risen every year since then. Dr Richard Wilkinson, an English epidemiologist, has written a very provocative book called Unhealthy Societies which suggests that the reason public health suffers as income inequality increases is that more unequal societies are less socially cohesive than more equal ones. The fine points of his argument are too involved to go into here, but Dr Wilkinson's basic reasoning is definitely intuitively plausible: He figures that in relatively unequal societies where people live at similar standards of living, it's far easier for them to identify with one another, to trust each other and to come together in civic groups. The more unequal the society, the more difficult it is for people to really identify with one another's daily lives, and the less likely they are to come together socially.
--F.Toro
(To reply, click here.)
The author replies: Excellent question, Francisco! I discuss the links between social capital and income inequality at length in Bowling Alone. There is a strong positive correlation across American states, across countries in the world, and (as you point out) across time in the U.S. between equality and social capital. No one yet knows which way the causal arrow runs, but most researchers now think it runs both ways. It's easier to connect in a society with smaller cleavages, but better connections also encourage policies that narrow cleavages. Interestingly, Richard Wilkinson himself has written very nice things about my work, saying that social capital is a key part of the story about inequality. On the health effects, the best work so far (not including my own work) suggests that the correlation between health and inequality is, in fact, mostly explained by differences in social capital.
As a political matter, the social capital agenda and the social justice agenda are complementary, not competitive. Both injustice and disengagement badly need to be fixed, and fixing one will help fix the other.
--Bob Putnam
(To reply, click here.)
Bob Putnam appears to believe that relationships premised upon proximity are stronger. This is only half-true and ignores that fact that many people in the past lived lives of quiet desperation. You were often stuck in destructive and eviscerating relationships because it was very difficult to travel regularly more than a few miles away from your front door. Modern communications and traveling dramatically increase the odds that we will find relationships more enriching and sustainable. It is not that Putnam's body of work is totally wrong, but I am convinced that the good far outweighs the bad if we barely say hi to our next-door neighbors. Our everyday relationships should be primarily premised upon having something in common with the other person. I will also reiterate what I have said previously: the clock will not be turned back! It would behoove us to instead focus upon enriching our standard relationships while reminding ourselves not to overlook those individuals within our immediate physical environment.
--David Thomson
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(6/20)
Mr Gillespie, after ranting about how much richer Americans are, criticizes Mr Putnam's book as follows:
This is a classic example of burning a straw man. Gillespie attributes an argument to Putnam that Putnam did not make (otherwise Gillespie would have quoted it) and then rebuts the argument. Putnam's view is that Americans suffer from isolation and emotional poverty--not that they suffer from economic poverty. Thus, Gillespie's assertion that we are all materially better off is utterly beside the point. The Bible asks whether it matters if a man gains the whole world if he loses his soul (loosely paraphrased); even 2000 years ago, people were aware that one could be materially wealthy and spiritually poor. Why can't Gillespie see something so obvious?
--Michael Lewyn
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My mother has a card club of couples she's gathered to eat, drink and play with for about 20 years. They've been through two couples' divorces, one remarriage, kids w/drug problems, kids with chronic illnesses, people moving, etc. They are a tight community. I want to find that where I live, but nothing seems to be gelling. Maybe I have to wait until I have kids and then other parents will become our friends, but I don't think it will be easy to find a group like my mom has. Just some thoughts. I agree the informal and formal social networks are dissipating. People have too many cell phones, houses that don't face the street, no front porches and too many commitments.
--AM
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How about email, and this message board itself. People are forming communities and gathering socially in different ways than they did before. It is not necessary for people to meet face to face in order to share ideas, converse or be political. All these things are happening now in non-traditional ways. A study that purports to measure social capital must take into account the new ways in which people are communicating with each other and forming social bonds or its results cannot be considered valid.
--Trev
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To Trev: Thanks for your insights. I agree completely that it would be irresponsible in 2000 to write a book about social connections that ignored the Internet. I didn't. When you have a chance to check out Bowling Alone, you'll see that I devoted the better part of a chapter to reviewing dozens of studies on cmc ("computer-mediated communication"), on-line communities, and the like. Frankly, the empirical evidence is mixed, and I'm ambivalent, so you may not agree with what I write. But I certainly don't ignore the topic. Here in synthesis is my take on the issue:
(1)The Internet had nothing to do with the downturn in social involvement. The evidence clearly shows that the downturn was underway before Mark Andreessen was born.
(2) Some research shows Internet usage associated with more social interaction, some with less. It's much too soon in the process to be sure whether the Internet will turn out to be a nifty telephone (helpful to social connection) or a nifty TV (unhelpful). Predictions at a comparable stage of the evolution of the telephone turned out to be mostly off the mark, so we need to be modest about our own wisdom.
(3) Technology is not a force beyond our control. We have it in our power to develop and use the new tools of electronic communication to strengthen old bonds and make new ones. We need to be about that task with gusto.
--Bob Putnam
(To reply, click here.)
The very freedom that the Internet provides to form communities based on interests, identities, and just about anything else we can dream up, is part of the problem when it comes to the death-of-local-community ties. I am certainly not going to argue that Internet communities are somehow lesser than other types because of the medium they use. I will point out though, that they don't foster involvement with local institutions, and their ability to support their members begins and ends with advice/encouragement. You can't really expect your friend from Yahoo clubs to travel halfway across the country to watch your kids when you are sick.
--Reality Check
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(6/15)